The impact of the legal framework for the consents process on the rate of development of offshore wind farms in England, and the achievement of 
Introduction
The United Kingdom (UK) is subject to a legally binding European target to obtain 15% of its energy requirements (heat, electricity and transport) from renewable technologies by 2020 (BWEA, 2008a; DECC, 2009c) .
Furthermore the Climate Change Act (HM Parliament, 2008a ) imposes a legally binding target, to reduce carbon dioxide emissions to 20% of 1990 levels by 2050. The generation of electricity from renewable sources is being seen as fundamental to achieving these targets (DECC, 2009c; Venables, 2008) .
Climate change is one of three key drivers for renewable electricity generation; the others are security of supply and affordability ( Fig. 1.) (DTI, 2007; Sellick, 2008) . Additional pressure comes from the age of the existing fossil and nuclear electricity generating fleet, which needs to be replaced within 50 years (Clarke, 8th June 2009) . Furthermore the UK's energy needs are forecast to grow, requiring an additional 30-35GW of new capacity by 2030 (DTI, 2007 . Fig. 1 . The drivers for renewal energy (adapted from (DTI, 2007; Sellick, 2008)) The UK has some of the best offshore wind resources in the world (Sustainable Development Commission, 2005) , and offshore wind farms are being heralded as major contributors to the UK's electricity generation mix after 2010 (BWEA, 2008a; DECC, 24/6/09) . Wind turbine technology is a proven technology and has been applied offshore with some success. Round 1 and 2 development, however, has not proceeded at the rate initially envisaged; this required some 4.5-5.5GW of operating capacity by 2010 (Burke, 2004; DTI, 2002) . If the UK is to achieve its 2020 target, a step change in the rate of development is needed. The challenges facing development are complex, but fall broadly into five categories: project economics, technical constraints, supply chain capacity, social effects, namely to amenity and aesthetics, and environmental impacts (Sustainable Development Commission, 2005; Haggett, 2008) . The legal framework for offshore wind farm development consent must address all these aspects. This paper will present the findings of a research project looking at the development of the offshore wind industry in England. The research focus was the legal framework for consents for offshore wind farms, and its implications for the rate of development, to date and into the future. The aim was to answer the question:
Is the legal framework for consents helping or hindering offshore wind farm development, and achievement of the targets for renewable energy generation?
The approach adopted was to:
explore the experience to date of the licensing and consenting process for offshore wind farms in Rounds 1 and 2;
gain an understanding of and explain the future consents process for Round 3;
identify, categorise and consult stakeholders in the process, and analyse their perceptions of the consents process;
assess whether the new process will successfully address shortfalls in the earlier process.
Due to differing legal regimes in the devolved assemblies in the UK, the project focussed on offshore wind farm development in England.
The research methodology is described in the next section. Our findings are set out in the following section, which presents the time frame for offshore wind projects and the results of stakeholder analysis for the consents
process. An analysis of the legal framework for future consents, including process diagrams for the current and future consenting processes, follows, and then the results of a survey of stakeholders' perceptions of the consents process are described. The findings are discussed in the subsequent section before conclusions are drawn and further work recommended.
Methodology
Internet research sought to construct a time frame for the consents process for Round 1 and 2 projects including forecast completion date for incomplete projects. Primary data sources consulted included the websites for wind farm developers and news archives. Whilst this approach the gave increased understanding of the extent of offshore wind farm development in England and Wales, due to time limitations and lack of data in the public domain, it was only possible to construct a typical timeline, rather than detailed time lines for each project.
Round 3 wind farm projects will be subject to a different legal regime to rounds 1 and 2. To gain a full understanding of the new consents regime, an analysis of the Planning Act 2008, and the Marine and Coastal Access Bill was undertaken. Drawing on the Government's own guidance that regulations should be written so that they are easily understood, implemented and enforced; that regulators should be accountable for the efficiency and effectiveness of their activities; and that regulatory activity should allow, or even encourage, economic development (Hampton, 2005) , This analysis sought to identify whether the new legal framework addresses the shortfalls in the previous consenting process identified by stakeholders in interview.
Stakeholder organisations were identified through the literature review and internet research. These were recorded in a stakeholder analysis tool developed for the UK Rural Economy and Land Use (RELU) programme (Graves and Morris, 2007) . Using an "analytical categorisation" approach (Reed et al., 2009) Rankings were made in accordance with the criteria defined by . Through this process it was possible to identify the "key players" and "context setters" in the consents process in addition to the "subjects" and "crowd" (Reed et al., 2009 ). This approach facilitated the identification of organisations for subsequent interview, with the intention that each of these groups be represented.
To gain an understanding of perceptions of the consents process across the industry, a series of telephone interviews was conducted. their own words and flexibility to speak about issues of specific concern to their organisation, which may not be relevant to all stakeholders (Gill and Johnson, 2002) . Further open questions in the third section sought to understand the perceptions of the new process for round 3, both in terms of improvements and limitations.
Interviews were conducted by telephone rather than face to face, to reduce travel costs and time demand (Robson, 2002) . Organisations were selected to be representative of a cross section of stakeholders at various interest and influence levels, from each of the groups of "key players, context setters, subjects and crowd" (Reed et al., 2009; Graves and Morris, 2009 ). An initial email introduced the survey and expectations, and requested to arrange a telephone interview with the relevant representative of the stakeholder organisation. Due to potential commercial sensitivities, the initial email included assurance that respondents might remain anonymous in the final thesis documents (Gill and Johnson, 2002) .
Telephone interviews were conducted with organisations responding positively to the request, and followed the questionnaire. Where interesting themes were identified, these were explored more deeply using structured interview techniques (Robson, 2002) . Whilst telephone interviews allowed data to be collected from a range of geographically dispersed stakeholders, at relatively low cost, the disadvantages of this method of data collection are that it is more difficult to build rapport, and there may be problems with interpretation when compared to face to face interviews (Robson, 2002 telephone interviews towards the end of the data collection period. The online questionnaire provided a means to obtain data from a broader range of stakeholders; however this data was more limited than that provided from telephone interviews, due to the lack of personal interaction and involvement (Robson, 2002) .
The bulk of the data collected was qualitative data, which was subject to analysis by the following steps (Robson, 2002; Miles and Huberman, 1994) : Follow up emails were sent to a selection of stakeholders to validate theories developed from the survey findings.
Findings
Time frame for offshore wind farm development
Internet research provided data to compile the projected growth in offshore wind generating capacity from rounds 1 and 2 wind farms, against Government targets ( Fig. 2.) ; This confirms the expectations of the industry (BWEA and Garrad Hassan, 2009b) . The rate of offshore wind farm construction will increase significantly over the next five years, with the final capacity from Round 2 coming on line by 2015. The total capacity at this time is forecast to be of the order of 8GW.
Using the same data, a summary time line for Round 2 wind farms has been compiled ( Fig. 3.) . 
Analysis of the legal framework for the consents process
The consents process for Round 1 and 2 offshore wind farms has been described in detail by Dower et al., 2002; Gray et al., 2005; Pettersson, 2008; Scott, 2006; Trinick, 2006 A process diagram of the section 36 consents process has been derived and is presented in Fig. 4 .This clearly shows the complexity of the current process. Offshore wind farms require some six separate consents, depending on the extent of the development, which are considered by four different consenting bodies. There is potential that the different consenting bodies will reach different decisions on whether to grant consent, and the timescales are inconsistent (DEFRA, 2008a) . Although there is an intention to bring the consideration of consents for offshore works together at a national government level (Pettersson, 2008) , the onshore works fall within the jurisdiction of local planning authorities. This can result in delays to projects, when local authorities decline planning permission, which may then become subject to public enquiry (Jay, 2008) .
Round 3 projects will be subject to a different consenting regime to their 
The Planning Act 2008
The Planning Act (HM Parliament, 2008b) intends to provide a more efficient, accessible and transparent planning system for significant infrastructure projects (DCLG, 2009) . The Act seeks to improve the consenting process by reducing the number of consents required and elevating planning decision-making from local level to national level, and hence reduce time and costs associated with obtaining development consent (Pitt, 2009) . Under section 15(3) of the new Planning Act, large offshore wind farms, with capacity greater than 100MW, will be considered Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects (NSIP). The majority of Round 3 projects will have capacity greater than 100MW (Wilson and Triggs, 2008 ), so will require development consent under this Act. This cut-off figure of 100MW appears somewhat arbitrary; with current technology this could be achieved with as few as 30 turbines.
Part 1 of the Act establishes a new body, the Infrastructure Planning Commission (IPC), with responsibility for making planning decisions for NSIP. The IPC will be independent of government and able to make "transparent, expert, accountable and ethical decisions" (Pitt, 2009) . The IPC will be guided by National Policy Statements (NPS) (HM Parliament, 2008b) part 2), which set the policy framework for planning decisions in specified fields of development, namely: energy, transport, water, waste water and waste (section 14(6)). NPSs will be prepared by the Secretary of State with responsibility for the field of development, and must take into consideration the requirement to achieve sustainable development.
In defining the NPS, there is a duty on the Secretary of State to carry out appropriate consultation and publicity (section 7). In defining the consultation requirements, the Secretary of State must consult with local authorities affected by the NPS (section 8). With respect to offshore wind farm development, however, it is unclear which local authorities will be consulted. The Act refers to local authorities where development is to be made, and those neighbouring them, however local authority jurisdiction does not extend offshore (Jay, 2008) . There is potential that all local authorities along the coast could be affected by offshore wind farm developments, which represents a vast constituency for consultation in preparing the NPS. Local authorities representing ports or industrial areas are liable to be supportive of offshore wind where they benefit the local economy. By contrast, those in areas dependent on tourism may be concerned about negative effects on the local economy. These conflicts will need to be managed within a context of achieving sustainable development, as defined in section 10 of the Act, namely the mitigation of climate change and the achievement of good design. The need to mitigate climate change implies a predisposition to decisions in favour of offshore wind.
A process diagram of the future consents process for offshore wind farms has been derived ( The emphasis is on the developer, in partnership with The Crown Estate, to complete the pre-application process including full consultation and environmental assessment, before the application for development will be accepted for consideration by the IPC. Section 42 imposes a duty to consult local authorities about proposed developments, and developers are also required to consult with local authorities with respect to how they plan to consult local communities (section 47). There is no definition of consultation (UKELA, 2009), which may lead to different approaches by different developers, and subsequently challenges to the process. It is to be hoped that the involvement of the Crown Estate will provide some consistency of approach.
As with consultation for the NPS, the extent of involvement of local authorities in the pre-application phase is unclear. Again the Act refers to local authorities where development is to be made, and those neighbouring them. The same conflicts with regards to industrial and tourist economies apply. Furthermore, the visual impact of the large wind farms planned for Round 3 may affect a number of different local authorities along a coastline, presenting potential for considerable local political conflict, and challenge to the process. The visual impact of offshore wind farms on coastal communities is a complicated issue and widely discussed in the literature (Haggett, 2008; Jay, 2008; Ladenburg and Dubgaard, 2007; Ladenburg, 2008; Ladenburg and Dubgaard, 2009; Ladenburg, 2009b; Ladenburg, 2009a; Santora et al., 2004) Timescales for publicising and consulting on the development proposal are also unclear (section 48). Section 45 specifies a minimum time frame for consultation with local authorities of 28 days, but no maximum time frame. Section 47 similarly specifies 28 days consultation with local authorities on how they intend to consult local people, but is silent on the time frame for public consultation. Furthermore section 48 is silent on the time frame for publicity. This opens a further possibility for legal challenge to the process.
Whilst there is an objective for the IPC to decide development consent applications within a 9 month time frame (sections 98 and 107), there is substantial flexibility to extend this. Section 55 allows the IPC 28 days to decide whether to accept an application. Thereafter, section 88 allows for an initial assessment meeting, with no real time limitations, which sets the start date for the 6 month examination phase. There is potential for this meeting to extend over more than one day, in which case it is the last day that sets the start date. Both consideration and decision phases may be extended by the appropriate authority under sections 98(4) and 107 (3) respectively. Chapters 6 and 7 introduce further uncertainty into the time frames for the consents process, by allowing for suspension of the process and intervention by the Secretary of State. These provisions reduce the potential for the IPC to be accountable for ensuring that its activities are effective and efficient, as required by the government's own guidance on better regulation (Hampton, 2005) .
In parallel to the application for consent to the IPC, the developer may also be required to apply to the MMO for a Marine Bill License for wind farms of capacity greater than 100MW, although this may be deemed under the Planning Act development consent. The Marine Bill will be considered further in the following section.
The Marine and Coastal Access Bill
Consent applications for Round 3 offshore wind farms with capacity less than 100MW will be subject to the provisions of the Marine and Coastal Access Bill (DEFRA, 2008b) . The Bill introduces similar reforms to marine planning as the new Planning Act does to land based planning (Wilson and Triggs, 2008) . It seeks to address the increasing anthropogenic demands on marine resources, including navigation, oil and gas, dredging for aggregates and fisheries, as well as offshore renewable energy and Marine Conservation Zones. One of the significant changes to be brought in with the bill will be the introduction of marine planning (part 3). Long term objectives will be outlined in a Marine Policy Statement (MPS), on which the MMO will base its decisions, much as the IPC will base its decisions on NPS. The MPS will provide a framework for regional marine plans (section 49), which will contain the policies for sustainable development within the area to which they apply. The MPS will consider all aspects of the marine environment and its use, and will need to be consistent with the NPS.
It is intended, that the IPC and MMO will work closely on all offshore renewable energy projects (DEFRA, 2008a) . Under section 23 of the Bill the MMO is made a statutory consultee for all IPC development consents and the MMO will be responsible for enforcement of development consents approved by the IPC. This implies a significant role for the MMO, which will need to be structured to support this.
Stakeholder Analysis
Forty different organisations or groupings of organisations, having a stake in the offshore wind farm consents process, were identified from the review of the literature and internet research. These were ranked for interest in and influence over the process. The results of this initial ranking are shown in Fig. 6 , which divides the stakeholders into the different stakeholder groups: key players, context setters, subjects and crowd. 
Stakeholder views
Firstly stakeholders were asked to give their own assessment of interest and influence in the consents process. A comparison of the initial assessment and with the stakeholders self assessment is given in Table 1 .
The rankings from the original assessment were largely confirmed except for the following significant movements:
developers move from being key players to subjects; local planning authorities move from key players to crowd; ports move from subjects to crowd. Although delay to project timeframes was the main concern amongst stakeholders, other factors were consent conditions and increased costs with negative impact on the economic viability of the project. Supply chain, technical (e.g. the grid) and environmental impact were also raised by some stakeholders.
With regard to perceptions of the new consents process for Round 3, most of the stakeholders who responded could see improvements in procedures, the time frame for considering and deciding the application, and greater consistency on the basis of the NPS and a single consenting authority.
However there were also views that there was scope for further improvements to the new consents process -especially in the areas of process characteristics, environmental assessment, procedures and consent conditions. On the wider policy side, two particular issues were raised: (a) continuation of the Renewables Obligation, whereby power suppliers pay a penalty for each unit of electricity generated from nonrenewable sources, which are then recycled as subsidies for development of renewables (Klessmann et al., 2008; Toke, 2003) ),as a means for improving the economic viability of projects; and (b) government support for industrialisation of the sector, including ports and the supply chain.
Discussion and analysis of findings
The research sought to develop an understanding of the legal framework for offshore wind farm consents and its implications for development.
From Fig. 2 , it is clear that to deliver all round 2 projects to achieve the 8MW forecast for 2015 will require a step change in development, and a further step change to deliver the 25GW expected of round 3. Projects suffer delays at every stage, not only at consenting.
Two major causes of delay identified were environmental assessments (EA) and procedures. EA delays resulted from having insufficient information to support the application and environmental statements (ES), requiring submission of supplementary environmental information, which may require additional survey work. It is necessary to understand the environmental impact of a new industry (Santora et al., 2004) and consultees argue that "upfront effort at scoping of the EA would have prevented problems of the iterative process later". There are, however, concerns from industry that "developers are made to collect data which are not strictly necessary for consents".
The consents process itself is described by one respondent as "incredibly laborious". Time tables are open ended and there is an impression that regulatory authorities can take as long as they like to make decisions.
Ineffective communication between regulators and statutory bodies, high staff turnover and the under-resourcing of consultees and regulators are also contributing to the delays. Considering the complexity of the issues involved, however, the time frame is not considered unreasonable -and is much shorter than it could be for other infrastructure projects such as nuclear power stations.
The third most significant issue in the consents process is the repercussions of development for other users of the sea, with the potential impact on aviation of radar clutter caused by turbines, obstruction to helicopter movements, and impacts on fishing and shipping being the most important (Plant, 2004; Plant, 2003) . These issues are known to the stakeholders in the process and mitigation measures are being implemented (DECC, 2009a).
Delayed consents increase the project risk profile and affect economic viability (Carbon Trust, 2008) . They make it difficult to schedule resources and can impact on relationships between the different stakeholders.
Furthermore, delays to consents can mean that milestones agreed in lease documents become unrealistic.
When consents have been granted, associated conditions can affect the economic viability of the project. Time limitations on construction activities to avoid disturbance during herring spawning season, can have the effect of reducing the available construction time during any given year to 8 months -effectively increasing the construction time frame by one third.
Furthermore these restrictions are applied inconsistently, respondents report blanket conditions being applied to areas well outside the spawning areas. There is concern that the precautionary approach to consents conditions does not reflect reality and that conditions need to be adapted on the basis of experience.
There is a relationship between delays in consenting and subsequent delays to the project. As a growing industry with supply chain constraints, one respondent observes that the offshore wind industry "is a sellers' market and suppliers will not enter into negotiation with developers until the project has consent." There is a further complication with respect to grid connection, which must be planned well in advance of the project coming on-line, but must be justified against a consented development (Carbon Trust, 2008).
Delays to development are not solely due to the direct or indirect effects of the consents process and consent conditions. Developers may choose to progress one development ahead of another for their own reasons, including internal programmes, policy or resources. Other critical factors identified include investor confidence in current economic climate and the ability of the supply chain to support the huge growth in demand for high specification offshore turbines that is foreseen (Carbon Trust, 2006; Rowley and Westwood, 2003) .
Expectations for round 3 consents process
The Planning Act 2008 does appear to streamline the consents process, as demonstrated by the process diagrams presented in Figs 4 and 5 of this paper. This is confirmed by the majority of respondents, although one did suggest "it will only cause more confusion".
The implications of the process are summarised by one respondent's statement as: "more upfront burden on developers, but a clear time frame for consents". Indeed the onus being on the developer to prepare and consult on the project proposal and the environmental statement prior to submitting the consent application to the IPC is considered by many to be a significant improvement. Although there is concern that there is a lack of guidance on what needs to be submitted with an application.
The move away from the current consenting regime with multiple consents and consenting authorities (Trinick, 2006) , to a single consenting authority with responsibility for granting all required consents is considered to be a major improvement; central decision making should build up consistency and experience. The time frame for the IPC to consider and decide consent is also viewed as an improvement. However, given the uncertain application requirements, it is unclear whether the preparation of the application plus the nine months to determine consent will represent any significant improvement to the overall project time line.
Furthermore there are a number of concerns about the detailed procedures and operation of the IPC which are seen as overly complicated or bureaucratic. There is a lack of clarity about onshore elements such as land fall of power and substations, as the Planning Act was not written specifically for offshore wind. Whilst the onshore elements are small they can have disproportionate impact on the overall project (Jay, 2008) . The supply chain and the transmission grid are both confirmed as critical factors for offshore wind farm development. There is no holistic, strategic approach to planning issues for development of the supply industry.
Manufacturers and other businesses may need to expand premises to accommodate the demands of the new industry. Consents for such developments will remain in the hands of local decision makers, who may have limited knowledge of the needs of the industry. Development of ports to support the industry is also a significant factor, and concern was expressed that "wind farms will get approved but ports will be left in the slow lane"
Furthermore a strategic approach to grid connection is needed (Farr, 2009 ), as one respondent notes "good grid connections and a robust grid will effect all power sources going forward". It is anticipated that the National Policy Statements (NPS) will provide a framework against which to package grid development work (Carbon Trust, 2008) .
Politics and policy are significant factors in the success of the new system and the industry as a whole. In particular the need to continue the Renewable Obligation to improve the economic viability of projects (BWEA and Garrad Hassan, 2009a) . NPS and Marine Policy Statements (MPS) to be produced subsequent to the passage of the Marine and Coastal
Access Bill, will need to be consistent and provide a clear strategic direction.
The importance of the sector as a growth area of the economy is being recognised in UK government policy (DECC, 2009c; DECC, 2009a) . A general election is, however, expected within the next year. The
Conservative party have stated that they will repeal the Planning Act should they come to power (The Conservative Party, 2009), adding uncertainty to the future for the consents process and increasing the risk associated with round 3 projects.
Stakeholder engagement
Self assessment by the stakeholders of their interest in and influence over the consents process largely confirms the author's initial assessment.
There are, however, some notable exceptions which provide insight into stakeholder engagement.
Government bodies largely fall into key players and context setters; they have the institutional power of decision or veto to the consents. The IPC and the MMO will fall into this category when they are established. All stakeholders with local interest fall on the boundary of subjects and crowd, indicating that they have similar, medium levels of interest in the process, which effects their local environment, but feel powerless over it.
The self assessment of local authorities as members of the crowd, rather than key players as anticipated, is surprising given their current role as the consenting authority for onshore works. It suggests that local authorities consider they have low interest in and influence over the consents process. The limits to their jurisdiction (Jay, 2008) partly explain this.
Furthermore one respondent reported a case where a local authority had refused planning permission for onshore works, only for that decision to be overturned by a higher authority. Another reason may be lack of engagement of local authorities by developers during the preparation of their consent application. Local authorities are, however, best placed to understand what is important to their communities (Jay, 2008) . This reinforces the need for clarity about the role of local authorities in the future consents process.
Industry stakeholders, being divided between subjects and crowd, have varying levels of interest in the process dependent on their position in the supply chain. They consider they have little power or influence over the consents process and instead inherit the consequences of the process, either as delay to their project or conditions to the consent.
The movement of developers from key players to subjects suggests that they believe that they have less influence over the consents process than anticipated. This is a cause for concern. Under the future consents process developers will need to take greater responsibility for progressing the pre-application phase and ensuring the completeness of the consent applications (DECC, 2009a) . Failure to do so risks the application being rejected and significant delay to the project.
The movement of ports to crowd from subjects indicates that they have a lower interest than anticipated. They join the majority of other suppliers to the industry. Ports, however, have a key role to play in future development, as highlighted by one respondent: "ports form the interface between manufacturing and offshore. Ports will need to develop to support wind farm developers, but the extent of development falls outside that defined as being of national significance in the Planning Act." Lack of consideration for the development of such support facilities and the supply chain may result in the transfer of these activities to other countries, and a missed opportunity for the UK economy (Carbon Trust, 2008) .
Conclusion
The aim was to answer the question:
Is the legal framework for consents helping or hindering offshore wind farm development, and achievement of the targets for renewable energy generation?
The study found that the current consents process has contributed to the slow rate of development of offshore wind farms, both directly and The precise extent of local authority involvement must be clarified with some priority. There is substantial risk of legal challenges to the new process as it develops, particularly from populations affected by developments.
By requiring the completion of the environmental assessment and consultation prior to submitting an application for development consent, the new process places the onus on developers to ensure the application is complete. Developers need to recognise that this makes them key players in the process and take responsibility for progressing the preapplication phase for each project, if momentum is to be maintained.
Without this, it is unclear whether the time frame for consenting decisions under the future legal framework will be any better.
The boundaries for associated development to be consented by the IPC need to be clearly defined. Whilst this may increase the IPC's workload associated with individual consent applications, it may take away the uncertainty associated with relying on local decision-makers. Government needs to take a holistic and strategic view of the industry and consider how the consenting needs for associated development of ports and the industrialisation of the sector should be supported. Without this vision it is difficult to see how their aspirations to achieve 70,000 new jobs and £100bn industry are to be realised.
Further work
In addition to the process diagram for the current and future consents process proposed by this paper, further work is required to clarify the detailed requirements for future consents applications. This may help address the lack of engagement with the process felt by developers.
Further work to investigate the reasons for this and how to improve engagement would also be useful. Guidance on the role of local authorities affected by developments is also required.
As round 3 progresses analysis of the actual time line for consent will confirm or otherwise the effectiveness of the future process. In order to establish whether the IPC will be able to achieve its aims of considering and deciding consents in the defined time frame, further work is required to assess the implications of all National Policy Statements, when issued, on demand for consents for nationally significant infrastructure projects (NSIP). In addition, consideration needs to be given to the boundaries of associated development for such projects and whether these extend to include planning and investment of support businesses and ports.
